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The Federal budget for fiscal year 1958 has a strong claim to the
distinction of being one of the most fluctuating of recent times, A
Federal budget tends to follow, in both preparation and execution, a
fairly predictable patterns it is prepared by the executive, after nearly
a year of effort; it is submitted for approval and modification to Congress,
where normally a billion or t wo is subtracted from the totals proposed by
the Executive (at a somewhat later time some amount of this subtraction
is restored by Congress) ; and then the budget plan is carried out, with
modifications dictated by changing circumstances.
The 1958 budget, however, has been characterized from the very
beginning by unusually severe changes in direction. It is quite probable
that these convulsions will be found to have been among the major causes
for the recession of 1957-1958.
In the nearly two years during which the 1958 budget was conceived
and partially carried out, it has been subjected to all the enormous pressures
that are always present. In addition, it was affected by certain massive
changes in the mood of the American public, and in the execution phase was
drastically modified to meet the demands of changing defense and e conomic
needs
•
The 1958 budget has been the recipient of terms of opprobium and even
of despair. A Wall Street Journal columnist referred to it as the "runaway
budget" , emphasizing the idea that it appeared to be no longer under the
control of either the Executive or the Legislature. During the heated
Albert Clark, "Runaway Budget," The Wall Street Journal . October




hearings held prior to the passage of the Appropriation Act of 1958, the
budget was referred to by Mr. Cannon, chairman of the Committee on
o
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, as a repudiated budget.
Any Federal budget is complex, as can readily be seen by a brief
look at the various stages through which it passes, and the variety of
powerful persons and agencies who have a right and a duty to influence it.
Any Federal program shown in the budget can have its components traced







In addition to these clear stages there are other activities which also
influence programs. Illustrative are the post-expenditure activities
that serve to modify the net outflow of Federal funds: the renegotiation
of defense contracts, the auditing of contractors 1 accounts by the Govern-
ment Accounting Office and other agencies, and the direct or indirect
influence of various kinds of investigating bodies as they look into
situations appearing to call for it. All these activities produce a return
of funds to the Treasury,
This paper will point out the "sufferings" of the 1958 budget in
its advance through the various stages of the budgetary cycle. The
2U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-




planning stage produced a proposed budget which appeared to lack the
enthusiastic backing of the President. The appropriation stage suffered
from wavering support of the budget by the executive branch and particularly
because of certain executive actions which will be brought out later. The
apportionment stage was used with greater severity than ever before to
attempt to keep expenditures to certain levels instead of for its more normal
use of insuring that programs were justified and up-to-date before the
release of funds. The commitment and obligation stages were brought nearly
to a standstill by expenditure ceilings and apportionment actions. The
expenditure stage became of central importance as the executive branch
attempted to avoid the exceeding of the national debt, ceiling on the one
hand and the calling back into session of Congress to raise the ceiling on
the other,
A number of the features of the Federal budgetary process were
clearly evident during the sparring, maneuvering, changes of course, inno-
vations in procedure — characteristics of all budgets and of the 1958
budget in particular*
Clearly seen, for example, is the historic feeling of the legislature,
whether correct or incorrect, that once the funds have been appropriated,
it is frequently shouldered aside by the Executive in monetary matters. In
the past, Congress has made a considerable effort to devise means to counter
what it considered to be the circumvention of its desires. This preoccupation
on the part of Congress sporadically continues, since it can still be said
today, as 3aid by Professor Lucius Wilmerding in 1943, that "... Congress
has not yet succeeded in devising a system of procedure stringent enough to

render efficacious its unquestioned right to control the public expenditure."-'
The legislative branch has also had the tendency to get into details
on budgetary matters. This tendency has been evidenced even while the
realization prevails that demands on Congressional time are too great to
permit anything more than the making of general policy. These conflicting
pressures have heightened the normal budgetary conflicts with the executive.
Our political setup apparently will not permit the arriving at a
completely objective program or group of programs which can be carried out
for the public good. Budgetary decisions, affecting both formulation and
execution, are of necessity influenced by major events of national and
international life. Near-term events of great political or economic import
frequently cast unnaturally large shadows on the budgets. The proximity
of elections, the state of the economy, changes in our defense requirements,
the unceasing political skirmishing for achievement of favorable political
positions among politicians, Congressional jealousy of assumed or actual
prerogatives, "salesmanship" of those who explain and defend programs before
Congress^ -— all these factors and many others make extraordinarily difficult
the arriving at a national program supportable by both the Executive and
the Congress*
Ho small part of the difficulty with the 1958 budget, as has been
true to some degree or other with previous budgets of recent times, has
been the lack of understanding that exists concerning figures and what they
^Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power . New Haveni Yale
University Press, 1943, p. 308,
^Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword . Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1950, p. 103.
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purport to mean. To start with, the figures involved are of such astronomical
size as to be generally incomprehensible. In addition to the incomprehensi-
bility there is confusion over the very terms used to describe various
aspects of the federal budget. It is not unusual, for example, to find
confusion between expenditure >;dgets and new obligational authority budgets.
Knowledgeable people have been known to make comments implying everything
from incompetence to mutiny when the expenditures for a year exceed the
new obligational authority authorized. There is also the tendency to grasp
"round1* and easily remembered figures and adhere to them even when situations
change. Dr. Gabriel Hauge referred to the"breaking of the $70 billion
•fiscal sound barrier"1 as being one of the shocks associated with the 1958
budget. This attitude fails to acknowledge changing needs of the country,
increasing price levels, increasing complexity of military equipment, changes
in the threat to national security, among other factors.
This p'aper will view the "Orphaned Budget 1958", pointing out the
significant events, trends, and policies that made this budget unique.
^Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Budget and Eisenhower", Fortune .
July 1957, p. 96.
'
CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1958 BUDGET
General
There are many interrelationships between Congress and the Executive
as concerns budget preparation. Some of these interrelationships are
statutory, some are of long-standing custom, and some are unofficial and
occur because of the specific personalities involved at the time.
Personnel in the Executive branch begin work on the proposed budget
many months before the Congress, and have these months in which to work over
the details, arrive at agreed upon and approved positions, and prepare
and M re-prepare" for the day of submission of the budget to Congress. Many
official and unofficial conferences between persons in the Executive branch
of the Federal Government precede decisions as to budgetary levels or goals.
Departments and agencies give the Bureau of the Budget "flash" estimates
which are then worked over, refined, and whittled down, eventually becoming
guidelines of the President to the departments and agencies.
In the summer of 1956, when the first round of conferences concerning
the fiscal 1958 budget was nearly over, the first or "flash" estimates
indicated that new obligational authority of $A&h billion would be required
for the Department of Defense. This apparently caused no great concern
since these first estimates are traditionally high and are worked downwards
in subsequent sessions. They were eventually to be worked down to equal
new obligational authority of $38.5 billion and expenditures of $38 billion,
1958 was eventually to turn out to be different, however, in that
it was in the nature of a crossroads: military expenditures, which had




to climb significantly. A slow but continuing inflation kept prices moving
upwards. Developments in technology made for ever more complicated and costly
weapons systems and equipment. For these and other reasons, expectations
that surpluses would lead to decreased taxes and reduction of the national
debt became little more than wishes and set the stage for the coming events.
Decisions on the budget had to be made in the immediate presence
of an election year. The President, the House of Representatives, and a
third of the Senate faced elections and had to be more than usually aware
of the implications of any budgetary pronouncement or action. In essence
the problem was to strive for a balance between what was felt to be economical
ly right and that which would provide "adequate" defense. These two goals
were working at cross purposes to each other; in general the more economies
that were made the less defense could be provided. Neither party could afford
to be called profligate with the national wealth nor, on the other hand,
could either party afford to be said to be "trifling with the national
defense."
The President was riding at a height of popularity and with the
continued great respect of the nation for his ability in military matters.
The issues being resolved concerning the budget did not get out into the
public political arena prior to the election, since very little information
is divulged officially before the submission of the budget to Congress.
There are evidences of considerable activity within the Executive





size. Very little of this, as far as can be ascertained, made its way into
the press in specific terms.
Beside the internal political climate there were international
7
considerations involved. Negotiations with Soviet Russia concerning
disarmament were under way and it was considered desirable to operate from
a position of strength, rather than from cutback military strength. Treaty
relationships with UU nations of the Free World were in existence requiring
various amounts of assistance under different circumstances.
Economic Climate
During the last half of calendar year 1956, when the work on the
fiscal year 1958 budget was proceeding at full speed, the economy was
booming to ever higher levels. The nation was confident, as indicated by
the actions of consumers, producers, and the government. Consumer debt was
remaining near the highest levels in history. Inventories of goods of all
kinds were at new high levels almost every month. Plant expansion continued
9
at a pace never before seen. The price level continued to rise, slowly
but almost continuously. The government was being pushed along on the wave
of confidence, and had been pushed into many fields in which its efforts
had previously been much less, such as urban redevelopment, more and better
7U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Appropriations. Hearings .
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958. 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 315.
gU.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Finance. Investigation of
the Financial Condition of the United States . 85th Cong., 1st Sess.





roads and highways, increased aid to schools, and expanded social benefits
of many types.
In economic matters, then, the general mood was one of confidence
concerning the future, willingness to gamble on the future and desire to
increase the Federal Government's part in many of the activities in order
to further increase security,,
" Pruning" of Departmental Requests
Through the last six months of 1956 the Department of Defense worked
the defense budget slowly down, painful billion by painful billion, from
the "flash" estimate level to $38.5 billion of new obligational authority
and $38 billion for expenditures. This level had finally to be approved by
the President, since Secretary Wilson could not agree to the lower level of
$36 billion wanted by the Director of the Budget.
Seeds of Trouble
A number of indications of future serious trouble began to be ever
more apparent. Some of the indications make very clear that budgetary matters
are affected by and affect almost every activity of national life: economic,
political, financial, military.
Pour of the most serious "seeds" of future trouble were the
following:
1. Adoption of strict expenditure ceilings Control over expenditures
in the past has largely been attempted and/or achieved through the control
of obligations. Even the apportionment process in reality is aimed at
Murphy, loc. cit .
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releasing money for obligation, rather than expenditure. The difficulty
arises from the fact that once an obligation has been incurred the govern-
ment has thereafter very little control over the timing of the subsequent
and resultant expenditures. When a contractor meets the terms of his
contract and presents his bill he must be paid within a very short time.
It became apparent in late 1956 that a ouch tighter control of
expenditures was going to be required during the remainder of fiscal year
1957 than then existed. This was to be made absolutely necessary in early
fiscal year 1958 by the close proximity of the national debt to the ceiling
established by Congress.
2. Continuation of inflation . The continually rising costs made
it impossible to plan for future costs with any degree of certainty. Nearly
all programs cost more than planned when time to pay for them arrived.
Increased labor and material costs on government contracts were of course
reflected in the expenditures of the government.
3. Economic gluttony and subsequent early signs of indigestion .
Increasing numbers of economists and other observers began to point out
evidence of excetoive inventories, excessive consumer buying on credit, and
over-expansion of productive facilities. It seemed likely that sooner or
later the economy would have to slow to digest a while.
£. Executive and legislative uneasiness with the size of the budget f
but inability or unwillingness to do anything drastic about it . 4n increasing
number of public figures spoke up about the necessity for slowing down and
even backing off on tho expansion of government into various social and
economic sress of national life. They expressed concern not so much for the
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expansion into these t>reas as they did for the ever-increasing cost of tMs
expansion. The political realities made it almost impossible to back off
from these programs, nc thus from the expanses, since the people maintained




CONSIDERATION OF THE BUDGET BY CONGRESS
Submission of Budget
Shortly after the convening of Conjress in January 1957, the President's
1958 Budget W8S submitted to the Congress. This normal procedure was
accompanied by unusual actions.
Most notable and publicized of the subsequent actions was a press
conference held by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey on January 16, 1937.
He first issued a prepared statement and then submitted to questions. One
of his remarks became unfortunately famous when it was taken to mean things
the Secretary apparently had not intended. The specific remarks were as
shown in the following quotation. The succeeding question is also shown
since it presaged the storm to come.
Secretary Humphrey. M I think there is; yes. I do. I think there is some
hope you can reduce expenditures all along the line. I would certainly
deplore the day that we thought we couldn't ever reduce expenditures of this
terrific amount, the terrific tax take we are taking out of this country. If
we don't over a long period of time, I will predict that you will have a
depression that will curl your hair, because we are just taking too much money
out of this economy that we need to make the jobs that you have to have as
time goes on."
Question. "Could we have the stenotypist read that back to us. That is a
good quote." 11
^TI.S. Congress, House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Hearings on the Budget for 1958 . 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington:




Secretary Humphrey later explained over and over again that what he
had meant was that no budget is static, that the budget had no holes in it
that he knew about at the time, but that he expected with the passage of
time thst Congress would be able to find some areas of savings, and that the
Executive branch would likewise be alert for opportunities to make reduc-
tions. 12
Reactions to Budget
Reactions to the proposed Federal budget were prompt and vigorous
on all sides, seemingly triggered by Secretary Humphrey's press conference
comments. Members of Congress vied with one another in shooting at the
budget, stating how much it should and would be cut. Republicans and
Democrats, leaders and followers, the press and citizens of all kinds began
to be heard on the excessively large size of the budget, and talking about
drastic action to cut it down*
Hearings on the budget began before the Committee on Appropriations
13
of the House of Representatives within s few days. The first witnesses
called were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget.
The first order of business was to put into the record a transcript of
Secretary Humphrey 1 s by then famous press conference remarks. The members
of the committee then began to work on t he Secretary with vigor attempting
to unearth any political significance in his press conference remarks, and to
get him to admit that there were soft spots in the budget and to point out




one or more of them. Throughout the questioning could be detected Donocratic
suspicion of the political aspects of the action of tossing a budget to
Congress end inviting it to cut. It is «lso clear that some cf the represen-
tatives were feeling the historic feeling of impotence wh^n ^-crd with the
budget. *This feeling can be illustrated best by this comment from the
hearings:
"Mr. Sheppard. I think your assumption is correct, although I
am under the impression that we are behind the eight ball to a certain
degree. Every witness who is sent up here by the executive branch to
defend its appropriation certainly defends it to th<= nth dogre« ar/1 never
gives us a break as to what might be saved
Throughout the hearings on the 1958 budget, all top level witnesses
from the Executive were subjected to the same sort o** miestions as waa
Secretary Humphrey, as the legislators searched for "soft spots". Secretary
Wilson, for example, in defending the budget of the Department of Defense
was repeatedly invited to show areas in which money could be saved.
'
In the last few months of fiscal year 1957 stringent controls on
expenditures were imposed by the Bureau of the Budget on the departments
and agencies of the executive branch. It had become ar parent that expendi-
tures would exceed the ceiling unless drastic measures were taken to slow
them. Departments wer^ given specific ceilings and directions not to exceed
them. Since it was late in the budget year comparatively fVw actions remained
to the departments other than to delay the making of obligations and to stall
^Ifaid .. p. 43.
*-*y.S, Congress, House. Committee on Appropriations. Hearings .
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958 . 85th Cong,, 1st Sess.,
Washington: Government Printing Office
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some of the bills arriving late in June into the next fiscal year,.
The Administration initially underrated the commotion that would
3rise because of the size of the budget. The President was slo* in rallying
his forces behind it and gave the impression of being unhappy with the budget
«
Mnally it became obvious that the program reflected in the budget
stood little chance of being passed unless the President took some strong
and forceful actions. He then appealed to the people and to Congress for
support, especially emphasizing the international oblitfations of* the United
States and the necessity for supporting the defense program.
Part of this effort was negated, as far as relations with Congress
was concerned, when word of a Bureau of the Budget instruction to depart-
ments and agencies became known to the Committee on Appropriations, The
instruction directed department s and agencies to guide their 1958 programs
by the 1957 levels, and stated that any increase over the 1957 levels would
need to be specially justified to the Bureau of the Budget. Congress
interpreted this to be a political maneuver in which Congress would pass the
larger 1958 budget, and the Executive would operate on the 1957 levels, and
would thus gain political advantage from achievDent of significant economies.
The attitude of Congress is best shown by quoting from the hearings before
a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Represen-
tatives, on July 12, 1957, just before adjournment:
Mr. Cannon, "The letter repudiates the 1958 budget. The 1957 budget
has not been transmitted to the House. So there are no firm estimates before
^J.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Public Works Appropriations,
Committed on Appropriations. Hearings on the 19£8 Budget . 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., Washington* Government Printing Office, 1957, p, 7,
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the committee and nothing on which to predicate an appropriation. There seems
to be nothing further we can do this morning. Without objection, the committee
17
stands adjourned."
It should be noted that this statement on the 1958 budget was made
on July 12, 1957, twelve days after the beginning of the fiscal year for
which funds were needed, and six months after hearings on this budget had
begun.
Concurrent Developments Foreshadowing Trouble
Various political, economic, financial and military developments
foreshadowed additional difficulties for the 1958 budget. Political figures
sparred on the 1958 budget throughout the period to attempt to end up in
the better political position. The boom had definitely levelled out, with
indications to that effect in nearly all fields of endeavor. The stock
market had levelled and tended lower. Basic metals had come into oversupply
and prices continued their decline. Interest rates were Ugh and being
maintained there to serve as an anti-inflationary force. Over-production
of goods and over-expansion of production facilities was becoming more
apparent. Inventories were at high levels and becoming a source of concern*
Automobile and steel production facilities were operating at less than
capacity and trending down.
It was becoming more apparent that expenditures during the first






Of great significance to industry were the actions taken by government
agencies, particularly in the Department of Defense, to attempt to restrain
expenditures. The deferral of obligations had the effect of beginning to
delay programs and of reusing some layoffs of personnel. This was to become
of much greater significance later, but began to be felt in this period.

CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST HALF IEAR UNDER THE 1958 BUDGET
There were many causes for the troubles which constantly enveloped
the 1958 budget, both in the planning and execution stages. Many events
trfinspired to make it necessary to deviate from existing plans.
In analyzing the various causes and attempting to determine their
relationships to one another it becomes clear that in the area of budget
execution, and particularly in the first half of fiscal year 1958, there
was one factor to which nearly all others can be traced. The factor most
responsible for setting in motion the subsequent actions relative to expendi-
ture ceilings, deferral of expenses, postponement of new obligations, stretch-
out of programs, and many others, was this:
THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE NATIONAL DEBT
AND THE DEBT CEILING WAS TOO NARROW.
The fact of a narrow operating margin between debt and ceiling
permitted the President only two alternative choices:
FIRST: TO ASK CONGRESS TO RAISE THE DEBT CEILING.
SECOND: TO SLOW DOWN EXPENDITURES AND LIVE WITHIN
THE EXISTING DEBT CEILING.
For various reasons the second alternative was chosen, and with the
choosing a series of actions was triggered. The actions led to certain
drastic results. Some of these actions will be pointed out to highlight the
great import of the basic decision from which they stemmed
Once the basic decision to live within the existing debt limit was





FIRST: STRICT EXPENDITURE CEILINGS WEJT SET.
SECOND: THE APPORTIONMENT PROCESS ^AS TIGHTENED UP.
The necessity for the use of strict expenditure ceilings is obvious,
since the narrow operating margin would permit only the least possible
expenditures. Obligations incurred in previous years had to be met when
the "bills" were tendered. Certain expenditures of fiscal 1958 were unavoid-
able no matter what drastic actions were taken.
The tightening up of the apportionment process served two main
purposes:
1, Insuring of closer scrutiny of all programs, to ascertain their
continuing validity, on the basis of the latest information available,
2. The slowing down of obligations and expenditures, since money
cannot be committed and obligated without first being apportioned. While
submitted apportionment requests must be acted upon within specified time
limits, it is possible to slow down the process by asking questions or
modifications of the requesting agencies just prior to submission of
apportionment requests. The requests are then delayed pending preparation of
answers to t he queries. This system is unofficial but is a very effective
device for the slowing of budgetary processes
.
Faced with these decisions and actions, the departments embarked
on certain necessary actions of their own. The ceilings imposed were 60
restrictive as to make mandatory very drastic actions and a nearly complete
departure from the normalcy so sought after in the execution of budget
programs
.
A preponderant part of the slowdown h^d to be absorbed in the programs
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embraced by the 1958 budget. Funds appropriated in prior years were in
large part already obligated. Expenditures resulting from these prior obli-
gations were almost impossible to slow down, since they were largely out of
the control of government agencies.
A lasting of some of the principal types of actions thpt the depart-
ments and bureaus had to take will more clearly illustrate the drastic nature
of the problem;
1. The postponement of the incurrance of new obligations.
2 e The stretchout of programs.
3. The deferral of expenses.
4.. The close, frequent, and regular monitoring of expense trends
and totals.
In such a large, complex, and interrelated group of organizations
as the Federal government, the actions taken above would very logically
reverberate everywhere. The actions on the part of most government depart-
ments and agencies were added to the severe setbacks being suffered throughout
segments of the economy, end the adverse effects were made more severe.
"Then, in lste 195?» Just when new orders for capital goods were
off sharply, and capital goods production was starting to drop,
the government belatedly began putting its fiscal house in order-
pressed by the necessity of staying under the debt limit. With
revenues seasonally low in the second half of the year, this
could only be done by holding down expenditures. And these were
in a rising trend, based on outstanding orders for defense goods.
The government adopted measures of unprecedented strictness to forbid
new expenditures in various civilian fields, canceled or stretched
out many defense contracts, and deferred payments on others.
Defense contractors, strapped for funds, were hard-pressed to get
the loans they now needed, witb the banking system still tightly
restricted by Federal Reserve actions. They became so uncertain
of government intentions that they began to cut their own programs,
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unload inventory, reduce payrolls, cut plant and equipment
spending." 18
Effects on industry were adverse and widespread. In general terms
the principal effects were in these areas t
1. Dislocation of plans
*
2. Decrease of production.
3. Difficulty in financing operations,
4. Layoffs of personnel.
Two extracts from the annual report of Thompson Products, Inc., of Cleveland,
Ohio, for 1957, best illustrate the situation prevailing throughout defense
industries having considerable government business.
"Early fall, however, brought a swift change in our outlook*
Action taken by the Defense Department to solve its fiscal
problems precipitated a sudden series of sharp cut-backs,
stretch-outs and hold orders, as well as a considerable shut-
off of new order placement.
Overshadowing all other events affecting Thompson people was
the heavy impact of a sudden reversal in aircraft schedules.
Employment was reduced of necessity from a peak of 25,HI in
April to 19,352 at the year r s close. It should be noted,
however, that more than 3500 of those affected bad been added
since mid-1956 in preparation for expanded aircraft schedules
that had been represented as firm and certain." ^9
The effects on government departments and agencies were also adverse
and nearly universal. Some of the principal effects were these:
1. Closing of some installations.
2. Deferral of some programs.
3. Deferral of some maintenance and repair.
1S
"How the Slump Got That Way," Business Week . April 5, 1958, p. 28.




Two extracts from the testimony of Robert E, Gross, Chairman of the Board,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, California, before the Johnson
Preparedness Subcommittee, give some further indication of the extent of
th^ effects of the actions that were taken.
"Although the growing Soviet strength hss been known for some
years, we have not geared our defense program to c ope with today 1 s
realities. Although we fsce a national crisis as grave as any
in our history short of actual war, we have been sore concerned
with balanced budgets, reduced taxes and business as usual than
with security from atomic annihilation.
It is rather ironical that in the sane newspapers recording the
Russian sputnik were reports of cutbacks, stretchouts and can-
cellations of contracts for weapons essential to our Armed Forces
because of funding problems and payment limitations ." 2^
Change in Mood of the Country
The confident mood that had prevailed for most of four years had
changed by late 1957, The stock market reached its lowest point in several
years. Unemployment wss increasing steadily. New cars were not selling,
"Business firms generally cut output to reduce inventories, slfished new
21
orders for cepitcl goods, reduced cspital outlays." Retailers of all sorts
had begun to cut back on inventories to a level wore approprifcte to the
general economic mood of the country a
And then Sputnik I — and a Change of Direction
Soviet Russia successfully launched the first earth satellite on
October 9, 1957 • News of the launching was received in the United States
20u.S. Congress, Senate. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services. Hearings Investigating Defense Prepared-
ness of the United States » 85th Cong., 1st Se3s., Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1957.
21Business Week , p. 27
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with 8 sense of shock, followed by much t alk and the initiation of many
actions.
The 1958 budget, in the painful process of being carried out under
the conditions previously described, began slowly to feel the change in
the mood of the country. There was a slight relaxation of financial reins;
expenditure ceilings were raised slightly; apportionment requests went through
with a little more rapidity; plans for supplemental and deficiency requests
to be submitted to the next session of the 85th Congress began to be prepared
with urgency; investigating bodies began to be formed; some additional
scientific experts were recruited into government service; selected programs
began to be accelerated — notably guided missiles, earth satellites and
atomic submarines; plans for a reduction in texes during the forthcoming
election year were discarded by both the Executive and the Legislature; the
likelihood of an increase in the debt ceiling, expected to be necessary in the
immediate future, became a certainty.

CHAPTER V
THE W.ST HALF YEAR TINDER THE FISCAL YEAR 1958 BUDGET
The last half year of fiscal year 1958 was only a little more than
half over as this paper was written. As a consequence it is not possible
to be conclusive concerning the budget execution during the period. As far
as the half year had proceeded, however, there were certain developments
worth noting as probsbly being indicative of the trend for the entire
period, and at least being among the features of the period,
A feature of the last half year was the lessening of the restrictive
pressure of the national debt ceiling. Congress approved the request of the
Executive for n temporary increase in the national debt ceiling. In addition,
the first few months of the year, as is usual, produced revenue from taxes
at a faster rate than the rate of government expenditure*
The Executive maintained tight control over expenditures through
expenditure ceilings, the apportionment process, and the reevaluation of
programs. There was apparently no use of the apportionment process to cause
programs to be delayed, but program managers were required to keep tight
check on their programs because of the ceilings on expenditures.
Probably the major feature of the period was the speedup in plans
for increased government expenditure, designed to counteract the effects of
the recession. Some defense orders to be placed in labor surplus areas
were expedited. Defense spending was stepped up overall. A long-range
shipbuilding program was instituted. Funds were released for construction
loans for local public works. Additional funds were approved for reclamation




compensation. Non-military purchasing was to be expedited. Most of this
money would not begin to be felt for some time but it did indicate a definite




The fiscal year 1958 budget can best be evaluated end analyzed from
a vantage point muc^ further in the future than that occupied by this paper.
Even at this time, at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the fiscal
year, two events have so clearly left their imprint on the budget programs
that the events seem very likely to be considered of major significance
even when viewed from the future. These two events need to be specially
emphasized and remembered in the future:
1. The national debt ceiling was too low during the first half
of the year and served to distort programs. Adherence to the restrictive
ceiling became a primary objective, was apparently allowed to supersede all
other considerations, and was directly responsible for drastic program
changes,
2, The imposition of strict expenditure ceilings resulted from the
restrictive proximity of the national debt to the national debt ceiling.
It cannot be considered to have been truly effective in restricting expendi-
tures since most departments, even after drastic steps, had to request
increases in the ceilings in order to avoid violations thereof. In addition
the ceilings became objectives superseding in importance the programs
to which they pertained, which although desirable from the standpoint of
funding was unduly restrictive to the programs.
It seems clear from the experience to date with the fiscal year
1958 budget that the national debt ceiling should not again be permitted to




If programs need to be modified or killed procedures for so doing exist
and should be used. The starvation of a pro.^raE to meet the completely
unrelated requirement of living within a debt celling is at least unbusiness-
like.
The fiscal year 1958 experience with expenditure ceilings w«s likewise
an unhappy one. Since, of all the budget stages, expenditures are the least
subject to influence by agencies of the Federal Government, expenditure
ceilings require drastic actions in other stages, end particularly in the
obligation stage. The government has least control once funds have been
obligated and can thus avoid spending only by not obligating. Exceptions
to this may save some money hut are to some degree wasteful.
Summary
This ]ook at the fiscal year 1958 budget as it was planned and
executed has left the writer with the firm opinion that in the future greater
efforts should be made by the Federal Government to insure that programs rise,
fall, or are modified on their own merits p When programs have to be
curtailed at short range because of influences unrelated to «iny merit
the programs may have, dislocations, wasted notion, inefficiencies, and
unfruitful expenses result. Thp government should never go into a fiscal
year without fiscal "maneuver room." It should exert control and plsce
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